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THE SEGREGATION AND RESEGREGATION
OF AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION:
THE COURTS' ROLE
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY

Schools in the South and throughoutthe country are resegregating.
Why is this occurring, and why were desegregation efforts limited
in their success? This Essay argues that the Supreme Court is
largely to blame. In a series of decisions in the 1970s, the Court
ensured separate and unequal schools by preventing interdistrict
remedies, refusing to find that inequities in school funding are
unconstitutional,and making it difficult to prove a constitutional
violation in northern de facto segregated school systems. In a
series of decisions in the 1990s, the Court ordered an end to
effective desegregation orders. Lower federal courts have
followed these rulings and, in many areas, have ended remedies
despite the likelihood that resegregation will follow. As Brown v.
Board of Education nears its fiftieth anniversary,American public
schools are increasinglyseparateand unequal. The institution that
provided the impetus for desegregation and offered so much
hope-the courts-is responsiblefor this failure.
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INTRODUCTION

A half century of efforts to end school desegregation have largely
failed. Gary Orfield's powerful recent study, Schools More Separate:
Consequences of a Decade of Resegregation,' carefully documents

that, during the 1990s, America's public schools have become
substantially more segregated. In the South, for example, he shows
that "[f]rom 1988 to 1998, most of the progress of the previous two
decades in increasing integration in the region was lost. The South is
still more integrated than it was before the civil rights revolution, but
it is moving backward at an accelerating rate."2
The statistics presented in his study are stark. For example, the
percentage of African-American students attending majority white
schools has steadily decreased since 1986. In 1954, at the time of
Brown v. Board of Education,3 only 0.001% of African-American

students in the South attended majority white schools.4 In 1964, a
decade after Brown, this number increased to just 2.3%.' From 1964
to 1988, there was significant progress: 13.9% in 1967; 23.4% in 1968;
37.6% in 1976; 42.9% in 1986; and 43.5% in 1988.6 But since 1988, the
percentage of African-American students attending majority white
schools has declined. By 1991, the percentage of African-American
students attending majority white schools in the South had decreased
to 39.2% and over the course of the 1990s this number dropped:
36.6% in 1994; 34.7% in 1996; and 32.7% in 1998.'
Professor Orfield's study shows that, nationally, the percentage
of African-American students attending majority African-American
schools and schools where over 90% of the students are AfricanAmerican also has increased in the last fifteen years. In 1986, 62.9%
of African-American students attended schools that were 50% to
100% comprised of minority students; by 1998-1999, this percentage
had increased to 70.2%.' The same pattern exists in North Carolina.
Between 1993 and 2000, the number of African-American students
attending schools with minority enrollments of 80% or more
1. Gary Orfield, The Civil Rights Project, Harvard University, Schools More
Separate: Consequences of a Decade of Resegregation (2001), available at http://www.civil

rightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Schools MoreSeparate.pdf (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
2. Id. at 2.
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. Orfield, supra note 1, at 29.
5. Id.
6. Id.

7. Id.
8. Id. at 31.
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doubled. 9
Furthermore, in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School
District, fewer than 60% of the schools meet the standard definition
of "diverse"; this number is down from 85% in the 1980s. 1°
Quite significantly, Professor Orfield's study shows that the same
pattern of resegregation is true for Latino students.1 The historic
focus for desegregation efforts has been to integrate AfricanAmerican and white students. The burgeoning Latino population
requires that desegregation focus on this racial minority too. 2 The
percentage of Latino students attending schools where the majority of
students are of minority races, or almost exclusively of minority races,
increased steadily over the 1990s. 3 Professor Orfield notes that
"[Latinos] have been more segregated than blacks now for a number
of years, not only by race and ethnicity but also by poverty." 4
The simple and tragic reality is that American schools are
separate and unequal. As Professor Orfield documents, to a very
large degree, education in the United States is racially segregated. 5
By any measure, predominately minority schools are not equal in
their resources or their quality. Wealthy suburban school districts are
almost exclusively white; poor inner city schools are often exclusively
comprised of African-American and Hispanic students. The year
2004 will be the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education,
and American schools will mark that occasion with increasing racial
segregation and gross inequality.
There are many causes for the failure of school desegregation.
None of the recent Presidents-neither Reagan, nor either Bush, nor
9. Susan Ebbs, Separate and Unequal, Again, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Feb. 18,2001, at 1A.
10. Id.
11. See Orfield,supra note 1, at 31.

12. The focus of desegregation in the South has traditionally been on whites and
African Americans because they were the concern of the litigation of the civil rights
movement. At the time, the states did not have a significant Latino population. Now,

however, the growth in the Latino population requires that this group be considered as
well in evaluating desegregation efforts. See Elizabeth M. Grieco & Rachel C. Cassidy,

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, "Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin," Census 2000 Brief, at 3
tbl.1, March 2001, http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbrOl-l.pdf (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (illustrating that Latinos are the largest minority group in
the United States); see also Orfield, supra note 1, at 17 tbl.1 (indicating that from 1968 to
1998, the Latino population enrolled in public schools has grown from 2 million to 6.9
million-a 245% growth in thirty years).

13. See Orfield, supra note 1, at 31.
14. Id. at 2.
15. See id. at 48. Professor Orfield explains that segregation by race relates to
segregation by poverty and to many forms of educational inequality for African-American
and Latino students. Id.
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even Clinton-have done anything to advance desegregation. None
have used the powerful resources of the federal government,
including the dependence of every school district on federal funds, to
further desegregation. "Benign neglect" would be a charitable way of
describing the attitude of recent Presidents to the problem of
segregated and unequal education; the issue has been neglected, but
there has been nothing benign about this neglect. A serious social
problem that affects millions of children has simply been ignored.
Nor has the federal government, or for that matter have state or
local governments, acted to solve the problem of housing segregation.
In a country deeply committed to the ideal of the neighborhood
school, residential segregation often produces school segregation.
But decades have passed since the enactment of the last law to deal
with housing discrimination, 6 and efforts to enhance residential
integration seem to have vanished.
There is not a simple explanation for the alarming trend toward
resegregation. In this Essay, I argue that the courts must share the
blame; courts could have done much more to bring about
desegregation, and instead, the judiciary has created substantial
obstacles to remedying the legacy of racial segregation in schools. 7 I
do not want to minimize the failure of political will, but every branch
and level of government is responsible for the failure to desegregate
American public education. I contend that Supreme Court decisions
over the last thirty years have substantially contributed to the
resegregation that Professor Orfield and others document.18
Desegregation will not occur without judicial action;
desegregation lacks sufficient national and local political support for
elected officials to remedy the problem. Specifically, African
Americans and Latinos lack adequate political power to achieve
desegregation through the political process. This relative political
powerlessness was true when Brown was decided and remains true
today. The courts are indispensable to effective desegregation, and
over the last thirty years the courts, especially the Supreme Court,
have failed. As discussed below, court orders have been successful in
many areas of the country to bring about desegregation.19 Courts
could have done more, but even merely continuing rather than ending
16. The last national housing law addressing discrimination, The Fair Housing Act,
was enacted in 1968. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title VIII, 82 Stat. 81
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (2000)).
17. See infra Part I11.
18. See infra Parts I, II.
19. See infra Parts I, II.
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existing desegregation orders (as the Supreme Court has mandated)20
would have limited resegregation of southern schools.
This Essay focuses on two major sets of Supreme Court decisions
that have contributed to resegregation.
Part I focuses on the
Supreme Court's decisions of the 1970s, especially those decisions
rejecting interdistrict solutions to segregation and inequality of
funding.21 Part II examines the Supreme Court's decisions of the
1990s, which ordered an end to desegregation efforts. 2 These cases,
and lower court decisions following them, have substantially
contributed to resegregation of public schools. Part III looks at why
this judicial failure has occurred. Some commentators, such as
Professor Gerald Rosenberg, argue that the failure to achieve
23
desegregation reflects inherent limits on the power of the judiciary.
I strongly disagree. The judiciary's failure lies in its actions, not in
inherent limits to its power. Had the Supreme Court decided key
cases differently, the nature of public education today would be very
different. 24 Although there are many causes for segregated schools,
the overarching explanation for the Court's rulings is simple: Justices
appointed by Republican presidents have undermined desegregation.
Four Justices appointed by President Richard Nixon are largely to
blame for the decisions of the 1970s; the cases were 5-4 decisions,
with those four Justices helping to make up the majority. 25 Five
Justices appointed by Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W.
Bush are responsible for the decisions of the 1990s that have

20. See infra notes 135-65 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) (limiting the power of

the courts to impose interdistrict remedies for school segregation); San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-58 (1973) (holding that inequities in school funding
do not deny equal protection).

22. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100-02 (1995) (holding that disparity in test
scores between white and African-American students alone does not prove the lack of a

unitary system or justify continuing desegregation orders); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,
485-92 (1992) (clarifying that partial compliance with a desegregation order should end

that part of the order, even if other parts of the order remain to be met); Bd. of Educ. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 246-49 (1991) (holding that once a public school system has

achieved unitary status, desegregation orders should end, even if a resegregation of the
public schools would result).
23. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:

CAN COURTS

BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (arguing that inherent limits on judicial power
inhibit the courts' ability to bring about social change, such as achieving desegregation and
equalizing educational opportunity).
24. See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
25. The four Nixon appointees-Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and
William Rehnquist-were joined by Justice Potter Stewart to comprise the majority
opinion. See, e.g., Milliken, 418 U.S. at 720; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 2-3.
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contributed substantially to resegregation of schools. 26
The
resegregation of schools is largely a result of the Court's decisions,
not of the inherent limits in the judicial process.
Thirty years ago, in a prophetic dissent in Milliken v. Bradley,27
Justice Thurgood Marshall reminded the nation of what is at stake in
the fight for desegregation:
[W]e deal here with the right of all children, whatever their
race, to an equal start in life and to an equal opportunity to
reach their full potential as citizens. Those children who
have been denied that right in the past deserve better than
to see fences thrown up to deny them that right in the
future. Our nation, I fear, will be ill served by the Court's
refusal to remedy separate and unequal education, for
unless our children begin to learn together, there is little
hope that our people will ever learn to live together.28
I. THE DECISIONS OF THE 1970s: THE SUPREME COURT
CONTRIBUTES TO THE RESEGREGATION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC
EDUCATION

The 1970s were a particularly critical time in the battle to
desegregate American schools. From Plessy v. Ferguson2 9 in 1896
until Brown in 1954, government-mandated segregation existed in
every southern state and many northern states. As mentioned above,
in 1954 when Brown was decided, only 0.001% of African-American
students in the South attended majority white schools."
After
Brown, southern states used every imaginable technique to obstruct
desegregation.
Some school systems attempted to close public
schools rather than desegregate. 3' Some school boards adopted socalled "freedom of choice" plans which allowed students to choose
the school where they would enroll and resulted in continued
segregation.32 In some places, school systems outright disobeyed
26. Recent desegregation cases, such as Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995), have
been 5-4 decisions, with the majority comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. See id. at 72.
27. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
28. Id. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
29. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
30. See Orfield, supra note 1, at 29.
31. See, e.g., Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 229-32 (1964) (holding that the
closing of public schools, combined with tuition grants and tax breaks to private
segregated schools, violates the Constitution).
32. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968) (overturning New
Kent County's "freedom of choice" plan as unconstitutional finding that it burdened
students and parents with a responsibility which remained on the school board).
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desegregation
orders.3 3
The phrase "massive resistance"
appropriately describes what occurred during the decade after
Brown. By 1964, in Griffin v. County School Board,34 the Supreme
Court had grown tired of the delay, lamenting that there had been far
too little speed, and ordered that all vestiges of prior segregation be
eliminated "quick[ly] and effective[ly].
The result of this massive resistance was that a decade after
Brown, little desegregation had occurred. In the South, just 1.2% of
African-American school children were attending schools with
whites.36 In South Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi, not one
African-American child attended a public school with a white child in
the 1962-1963 school year.37 In North Carolina, only one-fifth of one
percent (or 0.2%) of the African-American students attended
desegregated schools in 1961, and the figure did not rise above 1%
until 1965.38 Similarly, in Virginia in 1964, only 1.63% of African
Americans were attending desegregated schools.3 9
But the persistent efforts at desegregation had an impact. One
by one, the obstructionist techniques were defeated. Finally, by the
mid-1960s, desegregation began to proceed. By 1968, the integration
rate rose to 32% and by 1972-1973, 91.3% of southern schools were
desegregated.4 °
Many factors explain the delay between Brown and any results in
desegregation. Efforts to thwart Brown had to be defeated. The 1964
Civil Rights Act, in which Title VI tied federal funds to eliminating
desegregation, played a crucial role. 4' But so did renewed attention
by the Supreme Court to segregated schools. For a decade after
Brown, the Court largely stayed out of the desegregation effort. 41 It
was not until 1964 that the Court lamented that "[t]here has been
entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed" in achieving
desegregation.43
33.
judicial
34.
35.
36.

See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1958) (demanding that states follow
orders of the Supreme Court).
377 U.S. 218 (1964).
Id. at 232.
Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80

VA. L. REV. 7, 9 (1994).

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
insisted
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
See Neal Devins, Judicial Matters, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1034 (1992).
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), is a notable exception, in which the Court
on state compliance with a federal court desegregation order. Id. at 5.
Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 229 (1964).
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Too few scholars have focused their attention on whether the
Court could have done more in the decade after Brown to hasten
desegregation. The conventional wisdom seems to be that the
resistance was so great and the techniques of obstruction so varied as
to require years of conquering opposition to achieve desegregation."
While this view is worthy of merit, it may be too generous to the
Supreme Court. In Brown, the Court found that separate but equal is
unconstitutional, but it did not order a remedy. 45 A year later, in
Brown 11,46 the Court considered the issue of remedy, but did virtually
nothing: the Court sent the case back to the lower courts to achieve
desegregation "with all deliberate speed. '47 The Court did not even
order the Topeka Board of Education to admit Linda Brown to a
segregated school. Sixteen years later, the Court finally attempted to
provide guidance to lower courts in structuring remedies to
desegregate schools in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education.48 The Court approved techniques such as redrawing
attending zones and busing students to achieve desegregation.49 One
must ask whether it would have made a difference had the Supreme
Court in Brown II, or a case soon thereafter, imposed timetables and
detailed remedies for desegregation.
Whether such Supreme Court efforts would have hastened
desegregation remains unclear. But it is too easy to assume that they
would have made little difference in the face of massive resistance.
Had the Court dictated timetables, outlined remedies, and been more
actively involved from 1954 to 1964, results might well have been
different, at least in some places.
By the 1970s, as described above, the nation finally saw
substantial progress towards desegregation.
But three crucial
problems emerged:
white flight to suburbs threatened school
integration efforts;" northern school systems, which had not enacted
Jim Crow laws, required desegregation;5 and pervasive inequalities

44.

See generally UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REVIEWING THE

DECADE OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1977) (describing resistance to desegregation); J.
HARVIE WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE:

THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL

INTEGRATION, 1954-1978 (1978) (describing southern resistance following Brown).
45. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495-96 (1954).
46. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown H1).
47. Id. at 301.

48. 402 U.S. 1 (1971); see infra text accompanying notes 59-68.
49. Swann, 402 U.S. at 28, 30; see infra text accompanying notes 59-68.
50. See infra Part I.A.
51. See infra Part I.B.
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existed in funding, especially between city and suburban schools.52
The Court's handling of these issues was critical in achieving
desegregation. In each instance, the Court, with four Nixon
appointees in the majority, ruled against the civil rights plaintiffs and
dramatically limited the effectiveness of efforts at desegregation and
equal educational opportunity.53
A.

White Flight
By the 1970s, a crucial problem had emerged: white flight to
suburban areas.54 White flight came about, in part, to avoid school
desegregation and, in part, as a result of a larger demographic
phenomenon, namely endangered successful desegregation. White
families moved to suburban areas to avoid being part of
desegregation orders affecting cities. In virtually every urban area,
the inner city was increasingly comprised of racial minorities. By
contrast, the surrounding suburbs were almost exclusively white and
what little minority population did reside in suburbs was concentrated
in towns that were almost exclusively African-American. 6 School
district lines parallel town borders, meaning that racial separation of
cities and suburbs results in segregated school systems. For example,
by 1980, whites constituted less than one-third of the students
enrolled in the public schools in Baltimore, Dallas, Detroit, Houston,
Los Angeles, Miami, Memphis, New York, and Philadelphia.
Thus, by the 1970s, effective school desegregation required
interdistrict remedies. The lack of white students in most major cities
prevented desegregation. Likewise, intradistrict remedies could not
desegregate suburban school districts because of the scarcity of
minority students in the suburbs. As Professor Smedley explains:
Regardless of the cause, the result of this movement [of
whites to suburban areas] is that the remaining city public
52. See infra Part I.C.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 59-130.
54. A discussion of white flight including the context in which it occurred, how it
occurred, the extent to which it occurred, and the reasons why it occurred are beyond
scope of this Essay.
55. See Steven E. Asher, Note, Interdistrict Remedies for Segregated Schools, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1173-74 (1979) (discussing white flight in many major cities and
arguing that federal and state constitutional grounds justify interdistrict relief in a wide
range of situations).
56. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 785 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Negro
children had been intentionally confined to an expanding core of virtually all negro
schools immediately surrounded by a receding herd of all white schools.").
57. See T.A. Smedley, Developments in the Cases of School Desegregation, 26 VAND.
L. REV. 405,412 (1981).
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school population becomes predominately black. When this
process has occurred, no amount of attendance zone
revision, pairing and clustering of schools, and busing of
students within the city school district could achieve
substantially integrated student bodies in the schools,
because there simply are not enough white students left in
the city system.58
In Swann, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the federal
courts' power to impose remedies in school desegregation cases.59
The Court held that district courts have broad authority in
formulating remedies in desegregation cases. 60 The Court stated that
mathematical ratios-such as comparisons of the race in particular
schools with the overall race of the district-are a "useful starting
point in shaping a remedy to correct past constitutional violations."'"
In using these ratios, the Court emphasized that not "every school in
every community must always reflect the racial composition of the
school system as a whole. ' 62 In fact, "some small number of one-race,
or virtually one-race, schools within a district" may be unavoidable.63
Such a result, however, always should receive close judicial review in
a school system once segregated by law.'
The Court upheld the broad power of the district courts to take
"affirmative action in the form of remedial altering of attendance
zones ...to achieve truly nondiscriminatory assignments. ' 65 The
Court also stated that courts could use busing as a remedy where
needed,66 and that bus transportation is an important "tool of school
desegregation. '67 The Court found that busing students is a
constitutionally acceptable remedy unless "the time or distance of
travel is so great as to either risk the health of the children or
significantly impinge on the educational process. ' 68 But Swann
focused exclusively on remedies within a school district. The holding
did not address interdistrict remedies. When a school system is
comprised predominantly of minority students, there is a limit to how
much desegregation can be achieved without an interdistrict remedy.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1971).
See id. at 30.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 24.
See id. at 26.
See id. at 28.
Id.
See id. at 30.
See id.
Id. at 30-31.
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In 1974, the Supreme Court started to take a different turn in its
jurisprudence of granting broad powers to federal courts in
desegregation cases. In Milliken v. Bradley,69 the Court imposed a
substantial limit on the courts' remedial powers in desegregation
cases. 71 Milliken involved the Detroit-area schools and the reality
that, like so many areas of the country, Detroit was a mostly AfricanAmerican city surrounded by predominately white suburbs.7" A
federal district court imposed a multi-district remedy to end de jure
segregation in one of the districts.7" The Supreme Court ruled that
this desegregation technique is impermissible:
Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous
school districts may be set aside by consolidating the
separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing a
cross-district remedy, it must first be shown that there
has been a constitutional violation within one district
that produces a significant segregative effect in
another district.73
Thus, the Court concluded that "without an interdistrict violation and
interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an
74
interdistrict remedy.
Milliken has a devastating effect on the ability to achieve
desegregation in many areas. In a number of major cities, inner-city
school systems are substantially African-American and are
surrounded by almost all-white suburbs. Desegregation requires the
ability to transfer students between the city and suburban schools.
There simply are not enough white students in the city, or enough
African-American students in the suburbs, to achieve desegregation
Yet, Milliken precludes an
without an interdistrict remedy.
interdistrict remedy unless plaintiffs offer proof of an interdistrict
violation.75 In other words, a multidistrict remedy can only be
formulated for those districts whose own policies fostered
discrimination or if a state law caused the interdistrict segregation.
69. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
70. Id. at 752-53.
71. Id. at 725.

72. Id. at 732-34.
73. Id. at 744-45.
74. Id. at 745.
75. Id. at 744-45. But see generally Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del.
1976) (implementing metropolitan plan); United States v. Missouri, 363 F. Supp. 739 (E.D.
Mo. 1973) (finding school district to be a remaining vestige of segregation), 388 F. Supp.
1058 (E.D. Mo.) (supplemental opinion), aff'd in part, rev'd in part en banc, 515 F.2d 1365
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975).
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Otherwise, the remedy can include only those districts found to
violate the Constitution. While such proof is often unavailable,
plaintiffs in relatively rare cases have met Milliken's requirements.76
I grew up in Chicago, an urban area in which the city is
predominately minority, but surrounding suburbs are virtually all
white. For example, on the west side of the city, the Austin
neighborhood is almost entirely comprised of African Americans and
Latinos. But just across the border between the city and its suburbs,
Oak Park and especially River Forest are overwhelmingly white. An
interdistrict remedy could help to desegregate both the Chicago
public schools and the nearby suburban schools. Little would be
required except redrawing attendance zones. But Milliken ensured
that this kind of remedy would not happen.
The segregated pattern in major metropolitan areas-African
Americans in the city and whites in the suburbs-did not occur by
accident, but rather was the product of myriad government policies.
Moreover, Milliken has the effect of encouraging white flight. Whites
who wish to avoid desegregation can do so by moving to the suburbs.
If Milliken had been decided differently, one of the incentives for
such moves would be eliminated. The reality is that in many areas the
Milliken holding makes desegregation impossible.
In an important paper for the The Resegregation of Southern

Schools Conference,77 Professor Charles Clotfelter quantifies the
causes for segregation of public schools.78 Professor Clotfelter's study
dramatically proves the impact of Milliken in perpetuating
segregation and preventing effective remedies.79 According to
Professor Clotfelter, private schools lead to only about 17% of
segregation in the nation.80 By far, the most important factor,
accounting for segregation is racial disparities between public school
76. See, e.g., United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 456 F. Supp. 183, 191-92 (S.D. Ind.
1978) (finding that housing discrimination warranted interdistrict desegregation), affd in
part and vacated in part, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1980), cert denied sub nom. Metro. Sch.
Dist. v. Buckley, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); Evans, 416 F. Supp. at 352-53 (approving
interdistrict remedies when disparity in enrollment patterns are caused by government
activity); see also Hills v. Gatreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 305-06 (1976) (allowing an interdistrict
remedy for housing discrimination).
77. The Resegregation of Southern Schools?: A Crucial Moment in the History (and
the Future) of Public Schooling in America, held at the University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, August 29-30, 2002, and sponsored by the Civil Rights Project of Harvard
University and The University of North Carolina School of Law.
78. See Charles T. Clotfelter, Private Schools, Segregation, and the Southern States 34 (Aug. 30, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
79. Id. at 17-20.
80. Id. at 13, 32 tbl.5.
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districts.81 Milliken precludes courts, in most instances, from
remedying this problem, and thus is significantly responsible for the
segregation of schools in the United States today.
B. Proving Discriminationin Northern School Systems
Plaintiffs had no difficulty in proving discrimination in states that
by law had required separation of the races in education. But in
northern school systems, where segregated schools were not the
product of state laws, the issue arose as to the requirements for
proving an equal protection violation and to justify a federal court
remedy. Northern school systems were generally .segregated; the
issue was what plaintiffs had to prove for courts to provide a remedy.
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Keyes v. School
District No. 1, Denver, Colorado.82 Keyes involved the public schools
of Denver, where substantial segregation existed, even though state
law had never mandated the separation of the races.83 The Court
recognized that Keyes was not a case where schools were segregated
by statute, but stated that,
[n]evertheless, where plaintiffs prove that the school
authorities have carried out a systematic program of
segregation affecting a substantial portion of the students,
schools, teachers, and facilities within the school system, it is
only common sense to conclude that there exists a predicate
for a finding of the existence of a dual school system.84
Once a plaintiff proves the existence of segregative actions affecting a
significant number of students, an equal protection violation is
demonstrated and justifies a system-wide federal court remedy
because "common sense dictates the conclusion that racially inspired
school board actions have an impact beyond the particular schools
that are the subjects of those actions."85
Keyes held that absent laws requiring school segregation,

plaintiffs must prove intentional segregative acts affecting a
substantial part of the school system. The Court said that "a finding
of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful
portion of a school system ... creates a presumption that other

segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious."86 Such
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 8-14.
413 U.S. 189 (1973).
Id. at 201.
Id.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 208.
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proof places "the burden of proving that other segregated schools
within the system are not also the result of intentionally segregative
actions" on the defendant school systems.87
The Court therefore drew a distinction between de jure
segregation that existed throughout the South, and de facto
segregation that existed in the North. The latter constitutes a
constitutional violation only if there is proof of discriminatory
purpose. This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court cases
holding that when laws are facially neutral, proof of a discriminatory
impact is not sufficient to show an equal protection violation; proof of
a discriminatory purpose must also exist.8" But requiring proof of
discriminatory purpose created a substantial obstacle to
desegregation in northern school systems, where residential
segregation-which was a product of myriad discriminatory policiescaused school segregation. The reality is that Keyes created an almost
insurmountable obstacle to judicial remedies for desegregation in
northern cities. The government was responsible for segregation in
northern schools, but plaintiffs often found it impossible to prove the
government's responsibility.
C.

Inequality in School Funding

By the 1970s, substantial disparities existed in school funding. In
1972, education expert Christopher Jencks estimated that, on
average, the government spent 15% to 20% more on each white
student's education than on each African-American child's
schooling. 9 This disparity existed throughout the country. For
example, the Chicago public schools spent $5,265 for each student's
education; but the Niles school system, just north of the city, spent
$9,371 on each student's schooling.90 The disparity also corresponded
to race: in Chicago, 45.4% of the students were white and 39.1%
were African-American; in Niles Township, the schools were 91.6%

87. Id.
88. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-99 (1987) (holding that proof of
disparate impact is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation in administration of
the death penalty); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1976) (holding that proof
of discriminatory impact alone is not enough to prove a racial classification, there also
must be proof of discriminatory purpose).
89. CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF
FAMILY SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 28 (1972).
90. JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES:
CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S

SCHOOLS 236 tbl.1 (1991).
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white and 0.4% African-American. 9 Camden, New Jersey, spent
$3,538 on each pupil; but Princeton, New Jersey, spent $7,725.92
There is a simple explanation for the disparities in school
funding. In most states, education is substantially funded by local
property taxes. Wealthier suburbs have significantly larger tax bases
than poor inner cities. The result is that suburbs can tax at a lower
rate and still have a great deal to spend on education. Cities must tax
at a higher rate and nonetheless have less to spend on education.93
The Court had the opportunity to remedy this inequality in
education in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.94
The Court, however, profoundly failed and concluded that the
inequalities in funding did not deny equal protection.9 5 Rodriguez
involved a challenge to the Texas system of funding public schools
largely through local property taxes.96 Texas's financing system
meant that poor areas had to tax at a high rate, but had little to spend
on education; wealthier areas could tax at low rates, but still had
much more to spend on education.97 One poorer district, for
example, spent $356 per pupil, while a wealthier district spent $594
per student. 98
The plaintiffs challenged this system on two grounds: it violated
equal protection as impermissible wealth discrimination and it denied
children in the poorer districts the fundamental right to education. 99
The Court rejected the former argument by holding that poverty is
not a suspect classification and thus discrimination against the poor
need meet only rational basis review." ° The Court explained that
where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not

91. Roberta L. Steele, Note, All Things Not Being Equal: The Case for Race Separate
Schools, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 591, 620 n. 173 (1993).
92. KOZOL, supra note 90, at 236 tbl.2.
93. JOHN E. COONS, WILLIAM H. CLUNE III & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE
WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 45-51 (1970); Donna E. Shalala & Mary Frase
Williams, Political Perspectives on Efforts to Reform School Finance, 4 POL'Y STUD. J.

367, 368 (1976).
94. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 55.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 12-13.
99. Id. at 17.
100. Id. at 28-29. The Court determined that the system of alleged discrimination and
the class it defines did not have the "traditional indicia of suspectness." Id. at 28. In the
Court's view, the class was not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness
as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. Id.
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require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages.'0°
In
thoroughly viewing the Texas system for funding schools, the Court
determined that the system met the rational basis test.102
Moreover, the Court rejected the claim that education is a
fundamental right: 103
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive
constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether
education is "fundamental" is not to be found in
comparisons of the relative societal significance of education
as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found
by weighing whether education is as important as the right
to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there
is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution. 104
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, then concluded that
"[e]ducation, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit
protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis
for saying it is implicitly so protected."'0 5 Although education
obviously is inextricably linked to the exercise of constitutional rights
such as freedom of speech and voting, the Court nonetheless decided
that education, itself, is not a fundamental right:0 6
[T]he logical limitations on appellees' nexus theory are
difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is education to be
distinguished from the significant personal interests in the
basics of decent food and shelter? Empirical examination
might well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, ill-clothed,
and ill-housed are among the most ineffective participants in
the political process, and that they derive the least
enjoyment from the benefits of the First Amendment.107
The Court also noted that the Texas government did not
completely deny an education to students; the challenge was to
101. Id. at 23-24 (citations omitted).
102. Id. 47-53. After analyzing the various aspects of the Texas plan, the Court
determined that it was "not the result of hurried, ill-conceived legislation ...[or] the
product of purposeful discrimination against any group or class." Id. at 55. To the extent
that the plan of school financing resulted in unequal expenditures between children who
resided in different districts, the Court found that such disparities were not the product of
a system that is so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory. Id.
103. Id. at 33.
104. Id. at 33-34.
105. Id. at 35.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 37.
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inequities in funding. °8 In concluding, the Court found that strict
scrutiny was inappropriate because neither discrimination based on a
suspect classification"' nor infringement of a fundamental right
occurred."0 The Court found that the Texas system for funding
schools met the rational basis test.
In Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools,"' the Court reaffirmed
that education is not a fundamental right under the equal protection
clause." 2 Kadrmas involved a challenge brought by a poor family
against a North Dakota statute authorizing local school systems to
charge a fee for the use of school buses.113 The Court reiterated that
poverty is not a suspect classification and that discrimination against
the poor only must meet rational basis review." 4 The Court found
that the law did not deny any child an education because the fee did
not preclude the student from attending school." 5 Hence, the Court
said that rational basis review was appropriate and concluded that the
plaintiffs "failed to carry the 'heavy burden' of demonstrating the
challenged statute is both arbitrary and irrational."" 6
These decisions are wrong-tragically wrong in holding that
there is not a fundamental right to education. The Court should have
recognized a fundamental right to education under the Constitution,
as it has recognized other rights that are not enumerated, including
the right to travel," 7 the right to marry,"8 the right to procreate," 9 the
right to custody of one's children, 2 ° the right to control the
upbringing of one's children, 2' and many others.'
Education is
essential for the exercise of constitutional rights, for economic
108. Id. at 39.
109. Id. at 28.
110. Id. at 37-39.
111. 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
112. See id. at 457-59.
113. See id. at 452.
114. Id. at 458.
115. Id. at 459-60.
116. Id. at 463 (quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 332 (1981)).
117. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969).
118. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971).
119. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1942).
120. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650-51 (1972).
121. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63-66 (2000).
122. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-80 (1990) (finding
a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause to refuse unwanted medical treatment);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("Th[e] right of privacy ...is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision ... to terminate her pregnancy."); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding that the right to use contraceptives falls
within a constitutionally protected zone of privacy).
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opportunity, and, ultimately, for achieving equality. Chief Justice
Warren eloquently expressed this view in Brown:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance
laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education
to our democratic society. It is required in the performance
of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed
in life if he is denied the
123
opportunity of an education.
Almost three decades after Brown, in Plyler v. Doe,124 Justice
Brennan, again writing for the majority, recognized the vital
importance of public education. 25
He explained that "public
education is not a 'right' granted to individuals by the Constitution.
But neither is it merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable
from other forms of social welfare legislation."' 26 Justice Brennan
noted that both the importance of education in maintaining our basic
institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the
child, mark this distinction.1 27 The Court thus concluded that
education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead
economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. 128 Education is
so basic to the exercise of other constitutional rights, and so basic for
success in society, that the Court should have found a fundamental
right to a quality education.
The combined effect of Milliken and Rodriguez cannot be
overstated. Milliken helped to ensure racially separate schools and
Rodriguez ensured that the schools would be unequal. 129 American
123. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
124. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
125. In Plyler, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Texas law that provided
a free public education for children of all citizens and all noncitizens lawfully in the United
States and required children of undocumented aliens to pay for their public education. Id.
at 229-30.
126. Id. at 221.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. This is not to minimize the adverse effects of the other decisions, but Milliken and
Rodriguez are crucial because the former ensured the separateness of American public
education and the latter ensured their inequality. In theory, there still could have been
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public education is characterized by wealthy white suburban schools
spending a great deal on education surrounding much poorer
African-American city schools that spend much less on education. 3 '
II. THE DECISIONS OF THE 1990s: THE SUPREME COURT ENDS
DESEGREGATION ORDERS

Professor Orfield, briefly but accurately, notes a cause for the
resegregation of the 1990s:
Supreme Court decisions ending
In several cases, the Court
successful desegregation orders. 3'
concluded that school systems had achieved "unitary" status and thus
These
that federal court desegregation efforts were to end. 3
decisions resulted in the cessation of remedies, which had been
effective, and ultimately resegregation resulted."3 Many lower courts
followed the lead of the Supreme Court and have likewise ended
desegregation orders causing resegregation. 13 4
In several recent cases, the Supreme Court has considered when
a federal court desegregation order should end. In Board of
Education v. Dowell,'35 the Court determined whether a
desegregation order should continue when its termination would
mean a resegregation of the public schools.'3 6 Oklahoma schools had
been segregated under a state law mandating separation of the
races.'37 It was not until 1972-seventeen years after Brown-that
courts ordered desegregation.'38 A federal court order was successful
in desegregating the Oklahoma City public schools.'3 9 Evidence
indicated that ending the desegregation order would likely result in
dramatic resegregation. 4 0 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that
effective desegregation through actions of the federal or state governments. But such
actions did not occur, and Milliken and Rodriguez meant that courts, the most likely
agents for change, could not succeed in achieving desegregation.
130. See generally JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATION: A CIVIL
RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001) (discussing the combined

impact
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

of Milliken and Rodriguez).
Orfield, supra note 1, at 16.
See infra text accompanying notes 135-65.
See supra text accompanying note 7.
See infra text accompanying notes 166-77.
498 U.S. 237 (1991).
Id. at 249-50.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 240-41.
Id. at 241.

140. Id. at 242. After the School Board was released from the continuing constitutional
supervision of the federal court, it adopted the Student Reassignment Plan ("SRP").
Under the plan, which relied on neighborhood assignments for students in grades K-4, a
student could transfer from a school where he or she was in the majority to a school where
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once a "unitary" school system had been achieved, a federal court's
desegregation order should end even if the action could lead to
141
resegregation of the schools.
The Court did not define "unitary system" with any specificity.
The Court simply declared that the desegregation decree should end
if the school board has "complied in good faith" and "the vestiges of
past discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable."' 42
In evaluating these two factors, the Court instructed the district court
to look "not only at student assignments, but 'to every facet of school
operations-faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities

and facilities.'

"143

In Freeman v. Pitts, 44 the Supreme Court held that a federal
court desegregation order should end when a district complies with
the order, even if other desegregation orders for the same school
system remain in place.'4 5
A federal district court ordered
desegregation of various aspects of a school system in Georgia that
previously had been segregated by law. 46 Part of the desegregation
plan had been met; the school system had achieved desegregation in
pupil assignment and in facilities. 47
Another aspect of the
desegregation order, concerning assignment of teachers, however,
had not yet been fulfilled. 48 The school system planned to construct
a facility that likely would benefit whites more than African
Americans.149 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the federal
court could not review the discriminatory effects of the new
construction because the part of the desegregation order concerning
facilities had already been met. 5 ° The Court stated that once a
portion of a desegregation order is met, the federal court should cease

he or she would be in the minority. In 1985, it appeared that the SRP was a return to
segregation. If the SRP was to continue, 11 of 64 schools would be greater than 90%
African-American, 22 would be greater than 90% white plus other minorities, and 31
would be racially mixed. Id. In light of this evidence, the district court refused to reopen

the case. Id.
141. Id. at 247-49.
142. Id. at 249-50.
143. Id. at 250 (quoting Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968)).

144. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
145. Id. at 490-91.
146. Id. at 471.
147. Id. at 480-81.
148. See id. at 481 (finding that a racial imbalance existed in the assignment of minority
teachers and administrators).
149. Id. at 483.
150. Id. at 488.
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its efforts as to that part and remain involved only as to those aspects
of the plan that have not been achieved.'
Finally, in Missouri v. Jenkins,52 the Court mandated an end to a
school desegregation order for the Kansas City schools.'53 Missouri
law once required the racial segregation of all public schools. It was
not until 1977 that a federal district court ordered the desegregation
of the Kansas City, Missouri, public schools.'54 The federal court's
desegregation effort made a difference. In 1983, twenty-five schools
in the district had an African-American enrollment of greater than
90% or more.'55 By 1993, no elementary-level student attended a
school with an enrollment that was 90% or more African-American.
At the middle school and high school levels, the percentage of
students attending schools with an African-American enrollment of
90% or more declined from about 45% to 22%.
The Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
ruled in favor of the state on every issue. 6 The Court's holding
consisted of three parts. First, the Court ruled that the district court's
order that attempted to attract nonminority students from outside the
district was impermissible because the plaintiffs had not proved an
interdistrict violation. 57 The social reality is that many city school
systems are now primarily comprised of minority students, while
surrounding suburban school districts are almost all white. Effective
desegregation requires an interdistrict remedy."58
Chief Justice
Rehnquist, however, applied Milliken v. Bradley to conclude that the
interdistrict remedy-incentives to attract students from outside the
district into the Kansas City schools-was impermissible because
there only was proof of an intradistrict violation.159
Second, the Court ruled that the district court lacked authority to
order an increase in teacher salaries. 6 ° Although the district court
believed that an across-the-board salary increase to attract teachers

151. Id. at 490-91.
152. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
153. Id. at 103. Earlier in Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990), the Supreme Court
ruled that a federal district court could order a local taxing body to increase taxes to pay
for compliance with a desegregation order, although the federal court should not itself
order an increase in the taxes.
154. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 74.
155. Id. at 75.
156. See id. at 70-71.
157. See id. at 90, 92.
158. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
159. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 92-94, 97.
160. Id. at 100.
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was essential for desegregation, the Supreme Court concluded that
161
the increase was not necessary as a remedy.
Finally, the Court ruled that the continued disparity in student
test scores did not justify continuance of the federal court's
desegregation order. 62 The Court concluded that the Constitution
requires equal opportunity and not equal result and that,
consequently, disparities between African-American and white
students on standardized tests were not a sufficient basis for
concluding that desegregation had not been achieved. 163 Disparity in
164
test scores is not a basis for continued federal court involvement.
The Supreme Court held that once a district has complied with a
65
desegregation order, the federal court effort should end.
The three cases-Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins-together have
given a clear signal to lower courts: the time has come to end
desegregation orders, even when the effect could be resegregation.
Lower courts have followed this lead. Indeed, it is striking how many
lower courts have ended desegregation orders in the last decade, even
when provided with clear evidence that the result will be increased
segregation of the public schools. For example, in People Who Care
v. Rockford Board of Education,66 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed a federal district court
decision that refused to end desegregation efforts for the Rockford,
Illinois, public schools. 167 The court began its analysis by observing
that the Supreme Court has called for " 'bend[ing] every effort to
winding up school litigation and returning the operation of the
schools to the local school authorities.' "168 The Seventh Circuit noted
the substantial disparity in achievement between white and minority
students, but stated that although the Board "may have a moral duty
[to help its failing minority students,] it has no federal constitutional
duty.' 1 69 This analysis is the same reasoning followed by other courts
throughout the country in ending desegregation orders. 7 °

161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 101-02.
164. See id. at 102.
165. See id.
166. 246 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 2001).
167. Id. at 1078.
168. Id. at 1074 (quoting People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 153 F.3d 834, 835
(7th Cir. 1998)).
169. Id. at 1076 (citations omitted).
170. See infra text accompanying notes 171-77.
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Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has ended the desegregation remedy for the CharlotteMecklenburg schools, a decision that was upheld by the Supreme
Court in Swann. 7' Although this was a historically segregated school
system and desegregation had been successful, the court nonetheless
ordered an end to desegregation efforts. 72 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ended the desegregation order
for the Hillsborough County schools in Tampa, Florida.'73 The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Hillsborough County schools had
achieved unitary status.174 Notwithstanding the Eleventh Circuit's
conclusion, at thirteen Hillsborough Schools, Latino students
outnumbered whites and African Americans combined.'7 5 The
Eleventh Circuit stated that the segregation was the result of white
flight and voluntary residential segregation and thus was not a basis
for continued desegregation efforts. 76
In addition to these decisions by federal courts of appeals, many
district courts have ordered an end to desegregation efforts, including
several in 2002.177 In none of these cases did the courts give weight to
the consequences of ending the desegregation orders in causing
resegregation of the public schools.
The trend across the country of federal courts ending
desegregation efforts means that resegregation will increase,
potentially dramatically, in the next decade.
Professor Orfield
documents the resegregation that occurred during the 1990s. 78
Recent decisions indicate that this decade may see a much worse
return to resegregation.

171. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 335 (4th Cir.) (en
banc), reconsideration denied en banc, 274 F.3d 814 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S.
986, and cert. denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002).
172. Id. at 353.
173. NAACP v. Duval County Schs., 273 F.3d 960, 962 (1lth Cir. 2001).
174. Id. at 976.
175. Marilyn Brown, Beyond Black and White, TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 10, 2000, at Al.
176. NAACP, 273 F.3d at 971-72.
177. See, e.g., Berry v. Sch. Dist., 195 F. Supp. 2d 971, 999-1001 (W.D. Mich. 2002)

(ending desegregation efforts for the Benton Harbor public schools); Lee v. Butler County
Bd. of Educ., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1368-69 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (ending desegregation order
for the Butler County, Alabama public schools); Lee v. Opelika City Bd. of Educ., No. 70T-853-E, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2513, at *28-*29 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 13, 2002) (ending

desegregation order for Opelika, Alabama schools); see also Davis v. Sch. Dist., 95 F.
Supp. 2d 688, 698 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (ending desegregation order for the Pontiac,
Michigan public schools).
178. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
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III. WHY HAVE COURTS FAILED?

Scholars, such as Professor Gerald Rosenberg, see the failure to
79 I
achieve desegregation as reflecting inherent limitations of courts.
strongly disagree.
Desegregation likely would have been more
successful, and resegregation less likely to occur, if the Supreme
Court had made different choices.
If the Court, from 1954 to 1971, had acted more aggressively in
imposing timetables and outlining remedies, desegregation might
have occurred more rapidly. 8 If the Court had decided Milliken
differently' 5 -not a fanciful possibility considering the case was a 5-4
decision-interdistrict remedies could have produced much more
desegregation of American public education. If the Court had
decided Keyes differently,'82 then courts could have fashioned
desegregation remedies if there was proof of a discriminatory impact.
Requiring a showing of discriminatory intent dramatically limited the
ability of the federal courts to order desegregation of de facto
segregated northern city school systems. If the Court had decided
Rodriguez differently, there would have been more equality in school
funding and educational opportunity.'83 If the decisions of the 1990s
had been different,'" successful desegregation orders in many cities
still would have remained in place. Therefore, the dismal statistics
about current segregation are less an indication of the inherent limits
of the judiciary and more a reflection of the Supreme Court's choices.
What, then, explains the Court's choices? The answer is obvious:
its decisions result from the conservative ideology of the majority of
the Justices who sat on the Court when these cases were decided.
179. See ROSENBERG, supra note 23, at chs. 2 & 3 (discussing the failure to achieve
desegregation as reflecting limits on the powers of the judiciary to bring about social
change).
180. See supra notes 42-49.
181. See supra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
183. Indeed, a number of state supreme courts have found that inequalities in funding
violate provisions of their state constitutions. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929,
957-58 (Cal. 1977) (holding that the California school financing system violated equal
protection provisions of the California Constitution); Rose v. Council for Better Educ.,
790 S.W.2d 186, 215-16 (Ky. 1989) (finding defendant's common school financing system
unconstitutional); McDuffy v. Sec'y of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 617 (Mass. 1993) (holding
that the school financing system violated the state's constitution); Abbott v. Burke, 575
A.2d 359, 393-94 (N.J. 1990) (finding the Public School Education Act unconstitutional);
Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 156-57 (Tenn. 1993) (declaring
educational funding statutes unconstitutional); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777
S.W.2d 391, 397-98 (Tex. 1989) (finding the state school financing system in violation of
state constitution).
184. See supra Part II.
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Milliken and Rodriguez were both 5-4 decisions, and the majority

included the four Nixon appointees who joined the Court in the few
years before those rulings. If the Warren Court had decided the cases
in 1968, six years before Milliken and five years before Rodriguez, the
cases would have been resolved in favor of interdistrict remedies. If
Hubert Humphrey had won the 1968 presidential election and
appointed the successors to Justices Warren, Fortas, Black, and
Harlan, the result would have been different in these cases.
Similarly, the decisions of the 1990s were the product of
conservative, Republican Justices. In each of the cases, five Reagan
and Bush appointees-Chief Justice Rehnquist (who was nominated
by President Reagan to be Chief Justice), and Justices O'Connor,

Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-constituted the majority in ordering
an end to desegregation orders.
The cause for the judicial failure could not be clearer:
conservative Justices have effectively sabotaged desegregation. In
June 2002, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in

85 in which the Supreme Court upheld the
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,'
constitutionality of the use of vouchers in parochial schools.186 Justice
Thomas lamented the poor quality of education for African
Americans in inner cities and urged voucher systems as a solution.'87
The irony, and indeed hypocrisy, of Justice Thomas's opinion is
enormous. The rulings of his conservative Brethren have contributed

significantly to the educational problems of racial minorities. Justice

Thomas has never suggested that the Court reconsider any of the
185. 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
186. Id. at 2480 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of an Ohio law that allowed parents to use vouchers in the Cleveland city
schools. Id. Approximately 96% of parents used their vouchers in parochial schools. Id.
at 2466. In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld this use as constitutional. Id. at 2480. The
Court's division was identical to that in the 1990s decisions ordering an end to
desegregation orders: the majority was comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 2462.
187. Id. at 2480 (Thomas, J., concurring). Indeed, Justice Thomas lamented the
current condition of inner-city schools in very powerful language:
Frederick Douglass once said that "[e]ducation ... means
emancipation. It means light and liberty. It means the uplifting of the
soul of man into the glorious light of truth, the light by which men can
only be made free." Today many of our inner-city public schools deny
emancipation to urban minority students. Despite this Court's
observation nearly 50 years ago in Brown v. Board of Education, that
"it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education," urban children
have been forced into a system that continually fails them.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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decisions discussed in this Essay. But he is very willing to allow
vouchers, which would take money from the public schools and
transfer it to private, especially parochial, institutions.
CONCLUSION

During the Viet Nam War, Senator George Aiken said that the
United States should declare victory and withdraw from Viet Nam. 8'
The Supreme Court seems intent on declaring victory over the
problem of school segregation and withdrawing the judiciary from
solving the problem. But as Professor Orfield demonstrates, the
problem has gotten worse, not better. 18 9 The years ahead look even
bleaker as courts end successful desegregation orders. 19°

People can devise rationalizations to make this desegregation
failure seem acceptable: that courts could not really succeed; that
desegregation does not matter; that parents of minority students do
not really care about desegregation.
But none of these
rationalizations are true. Brown v. Board of Education stated the
truth: separate schools can never be equal. 9' Tragically today,
America has schools that are increasingly separate and unequal.

188. Albin Krebs, George Aiken, Longtime Senator and G.O.P. Maverick, Dies at 92,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1984, at B10.
189. See Orfield, supra note 1, at 2. Professor Orfield's report, including statistics from
the 2000 Census, illustrates that from 1988 to 1998 southern school segregation intensified.
Id. at tbls.1, 3 & 6. This trend occurred during a time period where three Supreme Court
decisions authorized a return to segregated neighborhood schools and limited the reach
and duration of desegregation orders. Id. at 2. Orfield concludes that from 1988 to 1998,
"most of the progress of the previous two decades in increasing integration in the [South]
was lost," id. at 2, and provides numerous recommendations for a stable interracial
education system. Id. at 48.
190. The issue of what could be done differently is beyond the scope of this Essay,
except as it is implicit in the criticism of what the Supreme Court has done. A major
national initiative for school desegregation is needed. This initiative could come through
Congress as it could document extensive segregation and inequalities in the public schools
and adopt a comprehensive statute mandating interdistrict remedies and equity in school
funding. There would be constitutional challenges based on recent federalism decisions,
yet remedying such inequalities is at the very core of Congress's powers under the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Alternatively, the Supreme Court could reverse
course and reconsider the decisions discussed in this Essay, which have contributed so
much to the resegregation and inequalities in American public education. There is no
indication whatsoever that these-or any actions-from Congress or the Supreme Court
are likely in the foreseeable future.
191. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).

